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ARTICLE is in large part a study in the American disease of constitu-

tionalism. By that phrase I do not mean that written constitutions are
bad. I refer only to our excessive fascination with constitutional questions. Like alcoholism, this fascination makes us oblivious to things that we
ought to consider. It prepossesses lawyers, courts, legislators and laymen with
the problem of constitutional power to the neglect of the problem of what,
apart from the Constitution, the law ought to be, or even is. It makes us feel
that the constitutional standard is the standard. It makes us forget that the
constitutional standard is a low one-a minimum.' The victims of this
malady forget that what is constitutionally allowable is not necessarily desirable or even legal.
I propose to show how the courts, including particularly the Supreme Court,
in spite of its canon to the contrary, 2 have regularly disposed of an important
issue of double jeopardy as a constitutional question when it ought to be
decided as a matter of common law. That the constitutional question need
not have been reached did not occur either to judges or counsel in these cases.
The issue is whether a man who has been acquitted or convicted by one
sovereignty (e.g., the State of Illinois) can be tried over again for the same
affair by another sovereignty (e.g., the federal government). In 1959, the
Supreme Court announced, six to three, in Abbate v. United States,3 that
nothing in the federal constitution prevented this form of double jeopardy.
Even assuming the correctness of that view as constitutional doctrine, the
t Member, Illinois Bar. The author served as court-appointed counsel in Bartkus v.
Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
1 Mr. Justice Stewart says that "the Supreme Court of the United States is ultimately

concerned only with deciding the absolute minimum standards that the Constitution will
tolerate." JusticeStewart Discusses Right of Counsel, 19 LEGAL AID BRIF CASE 92 (1960).
2
Ashwander v. T.V.A., 297 U.S, 288, 346 (1936) (Mr. Justice Brandeis concurring).
3 359 U.S. 187 (1959).
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subsequent prosecution is, I believe, still prevented by a common law rule
developed by the courts-a rule rooted in the same basic concept from which
the more limited constitutional protection arises. From this it follows that
a man cannot be retried unless the judicially developed common law rule has
been affirmatively changed by legislative act. But there is no such statute.
The time to consider the constitutional question is when such a statute comes
before the court.
An underlying theme of this article is that the doctrine of double jeopardy
has more serious implications for the legal order than has commonly been
appreciated. Double jeopardy sounds simple. The rule against double jeopardy is generally accepted. Actually it is a troublesome concept. Like other
things that are taken for granted, its central importance paradoxically gets
overlooked-even by the courts, including the Supreme Court as it weaves
its course among "changing fashions in due process." 4 I propose to show
how cases will be decided differently if the importance of the double jeopardy
principle is recognized.
Since the thrust of this article is based on the premise that double jeopardy
is an important principle, I shall first discuss at some length the reasons
behind the doctrine and the extent to which it is included in due process of law.
IMPORTANCE OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY

Reasons for the Doctrine. Even the man in the street knows what "double
jeopardy" means. He is rightly shocked when he hears that somebody has
been tried twice for the same thing. He does not question the right against
double jeopardy as, for example, he questions the right against self-incrimination. All advanced systems of law agree with him in abhorring the second
prosecution of a man who has already been determined innocent.
The reasons usually given by the judges and text writers are weighty but
do not seem fully adequate to justify the repugnance of lawyers and laymen.
It is usually said that to harass an individual with the anxiety and expense
of repeated prosecutions is intolerable. Expense to the public is another reason
that is commonly given. It has also been pointed out that repeated prosecutions increase the likelihood of convicting an innocent man; 5 in fact, on the
fanciful hypothesis of an unlimited number of prosecutions 6 the ultimate conviction of an innocent man approaches a mathematical certainty.
Double jeopardy is, of course, the regular form in which the res judicata
4 The

phrase is F. A. Allen's, Due Process and State Criminal Procedures: Another

Look, 48 Nw. U.L. REv. 16 (1953).

5 Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 188 (1957).
6 This may not be so fanciful. Suppose a man is tried for murder by planting a bomb
in an airplane, acquitted a dozen times at separate trials for the different victims, and then
finally convicted. See People v. Allen, 368 Ill.
368, 389,14 N.E.2d 397,407 (1938) (dissenting
opinion); Mayers & Yarbrough, Bis Vexari, New Trials and Successive Prosecutions, 74
HARv. L. Rnv. 1, 38 n.190 (1960).
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principle is made applicable to criminal law. 7 An important reason for the
rule against double jeopardy is often given in support of res judicata. That
reason is the social value of certainty. If I am unable to rely on repose following a judicial determination that I have the status of an innocent man or
that my punishment cannot be increased, society is apt to find me an unadjusted and relatively expensive member.8
But there would seem to be a stronger reason than any of these: to furnish
essential respect and support for the judicial process. Let us assume that a
man has been adjudicated innocent in a judicial proceeding that has come to
its full conclusion. To try him over again for the same thing is to hold the first
trial at naught; it disregards the validity of the first judicial proceeding. Retrial thus undermines the judicial process itself.
Let us examine this undermining more closely. Our judicial system has an
established tradition that a criminal trial must be conducted fairly. The courts
have vigilantly supported this tradition. They will, for example, reverse a
conviction obtained by a confession extorted by use of the rubber hose. The
Supreme Court has even set aside a conviction because the prosecutor had
remained silent when he knew that his witness was lying.9 The question asked
of the witness had gone only to his credibility. Although the question was
relatively unimportant, the conviction was set aside, thus showing how far
the Court will go in insisting that a state comply with notions of what a fair
trial should be.
As a result of the efforts of courts, legislators and administrators, a trial
may be a model of fairness. If there is no rule against double jeopardy and a
second trial is permitted, it likewise may be a model of fairness. And a third
trial. Meanwhile what has happened to the first trial? No matter how fair it
was, it has decided nothing. It has no effect. The courts will be wasting their
time developing standards of fairness in trials if the trial itself may be thus
disregarded. Worse than wasting their time, the courts will become discredited. They will be merely polishing the ritual of a dead religion.
If the prosecutor can, at his election, render a previous trial meaningless,
serious consequences would follow. In the first place the prosecutor might be
tempted to proceed with an inefficiently or incompletely prepared case when
7 Res judicata affirms that "a controversy which has been determined by a judgment
shall not be relitigated." RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS, ch. 3, tit. D, Introductory Note

(1942). Res judicata "is no less applicable to criminal than to civil proceedings." Sembasivim
v. Public Prosecutor of Malaya [1950] 66 T.L.R. 254,264 (P.C.). Res judicata will sometimes
protect the accused when double jeopardy will not. Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S.
575 (1948); United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85, 87 (1916); Note, 65 HARv. L. REv.
820, 874-80 (1952).
8 "Conviction of a felony imposes a status upon a person which ... affects his reputation

and economic opportunities." Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574, 593 (1960) (dissenting opinion).
See Mayers & Yarbrough, supra note 6, at 31; Note, 65 YALE L.J. 339, 341 (1956).
9 Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959).
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he knows that he will have a chance to do better or to present additional evidence in the second prosecution. Further, he might sometimes be tempted to
use improperly obtained confessions, the results of illegal searches and seizures,
improper interrogations of witnesses, and other unconstitutional or illegal
methods in the hope that he will be successful, all the time planning to put
the defendant on trial again in case a conviction should be reversed. Most important of all is the contempt that prosecutors and public would have for
judgments that could be relitigated at the election of a participant. Every
court would be reduced to the status of a justice of the peace whose decisions
are subject to trial de novo. 10 A judge's expression out of court is unimportant; the court's decision, on the other hand, is definitive. It is the business of
the courts to decide and settle controversies. That they do so is why the court
system works. The system will be stricken at its heart if courts cannot "consider the merits and render a binding decision thereon."" "It is just as important that there should be a place to end as that there should be a place to
begin litigation."1 2 That is true even though a court's decisions may be wrong.
Finality is indispensable to respect and support for the courts, the judicial
process and the law itself. That seems to be the best reason for the res judicata
principle.13 It seems to be the reason why res judicata has so much weight
that it overbalances any concomitant encouragement of overzealous litigation
or hampering of judicial flexibility, and outweighs even the desirability of correcting erroneous decisions.14 Judicial proceedings must be for keeps.15
10

Trial de novo is discussed in note 33 infra.
11General Inv. Co. v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 271 U.S. 228, 230 (1926).
12 Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 172 (1938).
13
Warwick v. Underwood, 40 Tenn. (3 Head) 238, 241-42 (1859), added that reason
to those usually given, saying that res judicata "is also intended to give dignity and respect
to judicial proceedings. What would be thought of the law and the administration of justice
if this kind of game [relitigation] could be successfully played in the courts." These words
have received merited repetition. 30A AM. JuR. Judgments § 326 (1958) and cases cited.
"Effective operation of courts. . . requires that their decisions have the respect of and
be observed by the parties, the general public and the courts themselves." Cleary, Res
JudicataReexamined, 57 YALE L.J. 340, 345 (1948). Res judicata "fosters reliance on judicial
action." Note, 65 HARv. L. REv. 820 (1952).
Professor Millar cites authority that, unlike common law and Roman law, the ancient
Frankish law and perhaps early Norse law did not have res judicata and the dispute could
always be reopened. Millar, The HistoricalRelation of Estoppel by Record to Res Judicata,
35 ILL. L. REV. 41, 42 n.8 (1940); Millar, The Premises of the Judgment as Res Judicata
in Continental and Anglo-American Law (pts. 1-2), 39 MIcH. L. REv. 1, 238 (1940). Mr.
Justice Black, in Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. at 163, cites evidence to show that this
is true of Russia today.
14 "The doctrine of res judicata precludes the parties from showing what is or may be
the truth. Why should not the truth prevail? ... The policy against relitigation is even
stronger [than the policy against starting stale actions that is embodied in the statute of
limitations]." Scott, CollateralEstoppel by Judgment, 56 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1942).
Obviously I disagree with the unsupported statement in Note, 73 HAIv. L. REv. 1616,
15 1 am indebted to Professor John T. McNaughton for the phrase in this context.
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Double Jeopardy as Due Process. If double jeopardy is as fundamental as
I have indicated, it would necessarily be a part of constitutional due process
of law. It would seem to be in that "category of special and extreme objectionableness"' 6 which requires the Supreme Court to strike down even state
action. It seems clearly to be destructive of ordered liberty. Surely nothing
could be more disorderly than a criminal procedure by which the same conduct is subjected to successive judicial inquiries which ignore the relevant results of the judicial process itself. The rubber hose is a more brutal and obvious violation of judicial order, but double jeopardy shares with lack of
counsel' 7 the covert quality of sucking all substance from the right, leaving
only the solemn and empty forms.
The Supreme Court has never passed on the precise point, probably because a plain case of double jeopardy, so palpably contrary to accepted views
and to state law, is rarely attempted. If it were attempted, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, at least, has said that the fourteenth amendment would be violated:
"A State falls short of its obligation when it callously subjects an individual
to successive retrials on a charge on which he has been acquitted ...."18 And
again: "A principle so deeply rooted in the law of England, as an indispensable requirement of a civilized criminal procedure, was inevitably part of the
legal tradition of the English Colonists in America."'9 Justice Harlan, speaking for the Court in Hoag v. New Jersey,20 clearly implies that there are situations where consecutive trials would be a denial of due process. Palko v.
Connecticut2l is sometimes carelessly cited to the contrary. Justice Cardozo's
famous opinion pointed out that the Court was only allowing Connecticut a
retrial in order to correct errors "all in the same case" 22 and was not considering a retrial "after a trial free from error." 23 "To allow the state to go that
1618 (1960) that there is a "broader social interest in bringing accused criminals to justice"
than in "preserving respect for the judiciary." Any justice, even justice according to the
whim of a despot, is perhaps better than not bringing accused criminals to justice at all.
But that is not the issue. The issue is whether letting an occasional criminal escape is worse
than an occasional undermining of the court. See Mayers &Yarbrough, supra note 6, at 31.
16Hastie, Judicial Method in Due Process Inquiry, GOvERNMENT UNDER LAW 333

(Sutherland ed. 1956).
17 The right to counsel was comparatively late in being recognized. It was not even well
established in England as late as the Eighteenth Century. Double jeopardy, however, goes
far back in history. For the historical background see Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121,
151-155 (1959) (Mr. Justice Black, dissenting).
IsBrock v. North Carolina, 344 U.S. 424, 429 (1953) (concurring opinion). This is a
natural and proper limitation on the statement in Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Tennessee, 161
U.S. 174, 185 (1896), that there is no federal question "if the State court erroneously decides
a question of law regarding the weight to be given one of its own judgments ..."See also
Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 469 (1947) (concurring opinion).
19 Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 200 (1957) (dissenting opinion).
22 Id. at 323.
20 356 U.S. 464, 467 (1958).
23 Id. at 328.
21 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
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far," says the American Law Institute's comment on its Penal Code, "would

probably violate the federal constitution."24
Double jeopardy includes more than former acquittal and former conviction. Those two are the heart, but the double jeopardy concept is wider. Its
application in adversary proceedings has given rise to a range of relatively
minor additional features. For example, jeopardy has been said to attach as
soon as the jury is sworn. 25 Thus the statement by the Supreme Court that
double jeopardy is one of the "protections which this Court has not required
a State to provide" 26 is probably intended only to refer to what was decided
in Palko: namely, that not everything included in the double jeopardy principle is binding on the states, and in particular that not all of the double
jeopardy concept of the fifth amendment is embodied in the prohibitions of
the fourteenth. Similarly, the quotations from Mr. Justice Frankfurter are to
be reconciled with what at first sight appears to be his inconsistent statement
that double jeopardy, "whose contours are the product of history"27 "is not
an evolving concept like that of due process." 2 8 This latter statement echoes
what he has said on previous occasions, e.g.:
Broadly speaking, two types of constitutional claims come before this Court. Most
constitutional issues derive from the broad standards of fairness written into the
Constitution (e.g. "due process," "equal protection of the laws," "just compensation"), and the division of power as between States and Nation. Such questions,
by their very nature, allow a relatively wide play for individual legal judgment. The
other class gives no such scope. For this second class of constitutional issues derives
from very specific provisions of the Constitution. These had their source in definite
grievances and led the Fathers to proscribe against recurrence of their experience.
These specific grievances and the safeguards against their recurrence were not defined
by the Constitution. They were defined by history.29
The explanation is that both classes of issues are found within the double
jeopardy concept. The fringe aspects of double jeopardy are in the class of
things defined by history. They do not necessarily inhere in due process. But
"the purposes behind the Double Jeopardy Clause," 30 being basic to civilized
24 ALI MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.09, comment (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956). Bartkus also
points out that Palko conceded that at some point multiple prosecutions by a state would
offend due process. 359 U.S. at 127.
2
5 See Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 688 (1949); Brock v. North Carolina, 344 U.S.
424 (1953).
26 Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470, 478 (1956) (rev'd. after reargument, 354 U.S. 1,
41 (1957)).
27
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 215 (1957) (dissenting opinion).
28 Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958).
29 United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 321 (1946) (concurring opinion). Cf. United
States v. Ullmann, 350 U.S. 422, 438 (1956).
30 Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 219 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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procedure, are part of due process. 31 The central core of double jeopardy, being due process, is an evolving concept, necessarily changing over the years as
the broadly defined offenses of the common law have been fractionalized and
proliferated into our present multitude of narrowly defined statutory offenses. 32
This paper, whether we are considering the common law or the constitutional aspects, is concerned only with the second class-that central feature

of double jeopardy where a man is being tried over again for the same conduct

for which he has already been finally 33 acquitted or convicted. A second prosecution for such conduct under the sameprovision of a criminalcode would seem

to be so raw as to be a clear violation of due process: it is unlikely to occur in
practice. Instead, a second prosecution is brought under a different provision
of the criminal code, a provision which seems to create a separate offense but
which is in substance the same offense. The man is being retried for the same
conduct under a different statutory provision which defines the conduct in
different language.
The problem of what is the same offense will be discussed in more detail at
a later point. 34 All that I am now asserting is that under the fourteenth amendment the Court will strike down a state court conviction when the defendant
has been acquitted or convicted by the same state for what the Court determines is in substance the same offense. A fortiori the Court will, under the
fifth amendment, strike down a federal conviction when the defendant has
already been acquitted or convicted in a federal court for what the Court determines is in substance the same offense.35
Having considered the significance of the double jeopardy principle, let us

deal with its application to specific problems.
31 Id. at 217.
32 Double jeopardy was more easily applied at common law because the offenses were
fewer and more broadly defined. The more difficult present-day judicial task is dealt with
on p. 604 infra.
33 The judgment must be final. It is not final if it is subject to appeal. It seems that
appeal or trial de novo (which is really a kind of appeal) may be made available even to
the state without violating the basic principle. (As to state appeal, see Mayers & Yarbrough
supra note 6, at 8-15.) Trial de novo, as I said in the text at note 10 supra, downgrades the
first court to the status of a justice of the peace court because the first trial would not be
taken seriously, being merely a trial run. Although trial de novo may be appropriated for
minor offenses, it seems to me that it must be established by statute and not indirectly-on
a different theory-through the common practice of the state courts to retry a man for
something of which he had been acquitted or convicted by a municipal court, i.e., a court
of different jurisdiction but the same sovereignty. For cases see 15 AM. JuR. Criminal Law
§ 398 (1938). Cf. Mueller, Criminal Law and Administration, 35 N.Y.U.L. Rnv. 111,
122 (1960). Within the federal system the Supreme Court has disapproved analogous
procedures (Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333 (1907)), even honoring judgments of
courts martial (see Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949)), although they raise the special
problem of the primacy of the civil authority.
34 Pp. 608-12 infra.
35

In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176 (1889). See pp. 604-05 infra.
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DOUBLE JEOPARDY BETWEEN SOVEREIGNTIES
One of the most important problems is that of successive prosecutions by
different sovereignties-where the defendant pleads a federal judgment of
acquittal or conviction in a state court, a state judgment in a federal court, or
a judgment of another state or foreign country. Contrary to what is often
said, there would seem to be just as much reason to bar the second prosecution as where only one jurisdiction is involved.
It is all the same to the accused. From his standpoint the situation is the
same whether the successive prosecutions are by the same or by different
sovereignties; one is as bad as the other. From the standpoint of sustaining
judicial action, only a chauvinist would argue that we can flout the final action of civilized foreign courts without in the long term undermining the rule
of law in general, and our own courts in particular. It is just as pernicious for
Illinois to disregard a federal judgment as to disregard an Illinois judgment.
36
A federal court ought to respect a valid state judgment as much as its own.
Whatever the weight given to the various reasons for the res judicata and
double jeopardy principle, all those reasons are fully applicable to double
37
jeopardy as between sovereignties.
The courts do not deny this. The Supreme Court simply finds that the principle against putting a man in double jeopardy is offset by another principle.
That principle is sovereignty, the sovereign power of a nation or state not to
be bound by the judgments of other sovereign nations or states.
In United States v. Lanza38 and Abbate v. United States39 the defendants
had first been convicted in a state court. They were retried for the same conduct in a federal court. In Bartkus v. llinois4o the defendant, having first been
acquitted in a federal court, was retried for the same conduct in an Illinois
court. Convictions on all three retrials were affirmed. The Supreme Court did
not decide that such double jeopardy is required by due process as normally
interpreted. That is, the Court did not find that double jeopardy inflicted by
36 The federal courts are required by statute to give full faith and credit to state proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1958).
37 This is true even though it often has been said that the difference in the prosecuting
governments makes res judicata or collateral estoppel inapplicable because the parties
are different. See, e.g., Comment, CollateralEstoppel in CriminalCases, 28 U. Cm. L. Rav.
142, 143 n.4 (1960). The hollowness of that distinction is shown by the Assimilative Crimes
Act and other examples given on pp. 606-08 infra.The real party in both cases is the publicobviously so where the two governments are those of an American state and the nation.
The difference in parties is irrevelant to the reasons for the res judicata principle. The controversy is the same, just as it is where a party to a lawsuit is changed from one governmental
officer to his successor in office, or where a ship and its owner are claimed to be different
persons in the effort to avoid res judicata. Comment, Application of the Doctrine of Res
Judicata to Successive In Personam and In Rem Actions in Admiralty, 27 U. CM. L. REv.
381, 384 (1960); Perkins, CollateralEstoppel in Criminal Cases, 1960 U. ILL. L.F. 533, 568
n.221.
38 260 U.S. 377 (1922).
39 359 U.S. 187 (1959).
40 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
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the combined action of two jurisdictions is any less harsh to the defendants
or less contrary to ordered liberty than if it is inflicted by the same jurisdiction. Instead, all three cases rest on the weight given American federalism.
Federalism was found to require an exception to the double jeopardy principle. Our federal system was thought to require an unfortunate result. 41 In
order not to upset the federal system the Court felt it must decide that the
Constitution did not prevent what had been done. The Court found that if
due process is to be preserved in this area, it must be preserved by the legislature and not by the judiciary. In effect, that whether judgments of foreign
jurisdictions are to be respected is a political question. This leaves it to the
states to determine the extent to which they will respect the criminal judgments
of other states, nations or the federal courts. It leaves to Congress to determine the extent to which the federal courts will respect the criminal judgments
of the states or foreign nations. This outcome does not make it due process to
try a man twice, any more than diplomatic immunity, which prevents court
action,42 makes robbery by a diplomat not robbery. Like diplomatic immunity, this rule has, for practical political reasons, been deemed to create an
exception to general principle. The exception blocks the regular procedure
but the mischief remains the same.
Let us assume, for the purposes of this article only, that the political reasons
are valid, or at least strong enough to overcome the views of the Bartkus
and Abbate dissenting justices and their academic supporters. Let us accept
the Court's constitutional theory as reflected in Lanza, Bartkus and Abbate.43
Let us assume, therefore, that under the Constitution the state and the nation
each has the power to retry a man who has already been acquitted or convicted
by the other.
Having the power, of course, is far different from using it. Powers are not
always exercised. State and nation possess much power that they do not deem
it wise to exert. Whether it is wise to use the power to put a man in double
jeopardy would seem to be a decision for the legislature. In the absence of a
statute it ought not to be within the province of a prosecutor, state or federal,
to decide that a man will be retried in violation of the ancient common law
right against double jeopardy.
41 One of those "results with which a court is in little sympathy." Id. at 138.
42 1 Stat. 117 (1790), 22 U.S.C. § 252 (1958).

43 This does not mean that all these cases were correctly decided even under the Court's
theory. I go on to contend that Lanza and Abbate were not. I do not deal with the weakness
of Bartkus in making a "doctrinaire absolute" (Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147,163 (1959)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring)) of the dichotomy inherent in a conceptualistic federalism,
nor with Bartkus"paradoxical solicitude to protect the finality of a particular state judgment by laying down the rule that state and federal courts can disregard the finality of
all the criminal judgments of each other. The weight of law review criticism is heavily
against all three decisions. See, e.g., Mueller, supra note 33, at 130-31; Franck, An International Lawyer Looks at the Bartkus Rule, 34 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1096 1103 (1959); Note,
1959 U. ILL. L.F. 677.
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But the courts have regularly allowed prosecutors to do just that. Blinded
by our obsession with constitutional issues, the courts have hurried to deal
with the question of constitutional power. Finding that the constitutional
power to retry a man exists, they have failed to consider that it may not have
been exercised according to law. The courts have failed to distinguish between disregard of a foreign judgment when authorized by statute and disregard of a foreign judgment at the unauthorized election of the prosecutor.
They have abdicated the role and responsibility of the judiciary to implement
common law concepts unless affirmatively directed to act otherwise by the
legislative branch of government.
For example, consider United States v. Lanza,44 the main authority relied
on by the Supreme Court in the other two cases. During the period of national
prohibition Lanza was convicted in a state court for selling liquor and was
fined $750. To give him more punishment he was then prosecuted for the
same transaction in a federal court. The Supreme Court held that this could
be done, on the ground that the power of the federal government would be
sterilized if it were bound by the state action. But the decision seems wrong,
even assuming the correctness of the Court's view of the constitutional question. There was, and is, no federal statute authorizing retrial after a state conviction. Until such a statute has been passed, there is no constitutional principle requiring that dual prosecutions be upheld. As long as the Supreme
Court adheres to the theory that Congress or a state has constitutional power
to pass such a statute, the balance between state and nation remains undisturbed. Since dual prosecutions are in derogation of a basic principle of ordered liberty, they should not be permitted except where constitutional necessities require. An exception to the fundamental rules of due process should
be no larger than necessary.
The constitutional theory expressed in Lanza (and Abbate) does not require that the exception be any greater than I have suggested. But what those
cases decided goes beyond the necessities of the theory. Sovereign power is not
sterilized where it has not been exerted. Putting it another way, if double
jeopardy is prohibited by a common law principle (applying between jurisdictions as well as within a jurisdiction), there is no constitutional reason why
that common law principle cannot be carried out-always assuming that it
has not been changed by statute. The constitutional question thus would not
be reached.
The final paragraph of Lanza stated: "If Congress sees fit to bar prosecution.., it can, of course, do so... ...
45 The Court would have done better
to say: "Until Congress sees fit to provide that a prior conviction shall not
be a bar, the common law principle bars double jeopardy, and no constitutional question is raised."
44 260 U.S. 377 (1922).
45 Id. at 385.
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In Abbate v. United States,46 following an Illinois conviction for damaging
a telephone line, a man was convicted under a federal statute47 for the same
act because the line was used in transmitting United States Government messages. The reasoning in this case is similarly objectionable. Because there was
no federal statute permitting retrials, there was no need to reach the constitutional question. The Court, however, and counsel, 48 never considered that
there might be any other issue than that of the fifth amendment. The Court
followed the reasoning-which it recognized as dictum 49-expressed in a long
line of pre-Lanza cases beginning in 1820 with Houston v. MooreO where "all
members of the Court agreed that the Fifth Amendment would not prohibit
a federal prosecution.... ."51 Fascinated with constitutionalism, the judges,
in 1820 and in 1959, failed to consider that even if the fifth amendment does
not prohibit something, action by Congress may still be required before it can
be done. The Abbate court would have done better with an approach analogous to that in McNabb v. United States:
In the view we take of the case, however, it becomes unnecessary to reach the
Constitutional issue pressed upon us.... [Tihe scope of our reviewing power over
convictions brought here from the federal courts is not confined to ascertainment
of Constitutional validity. Judicial supervision of the administration of criminal
justice in the federal courts implies the duty of establishing and maintaining civilized
standards of procedure and evidence. Such standards are not satisfied merely by
observance of those minimal historic safeguards for securing trial by reasons which
are summarized as "due process of law" and below which we reach what is really
trial by force. 52
Congress not having changed it, the common law double jeopardy standard
should have been recognized and given effect in Abbate as well as in Lanza.
This would merely mean giving a prior state conviction the same force that
would be given a prior federal conviction for what the court determines is in
substance the same offense. Whether it is in substance the same offense remains a vital issue. The actual decision in Abbate, then, can perhaps be sup46 359 U.S 187 (1959).

47 18 U.S.C. §1362 (1958).
48
Nor, I confess, did it occur to me, as counsel in Bartkus, to urge it as one of the many
defects in the superficial opinion in Lanza. For others see Grant, Successive Prosecutions
by State and Nation, 4 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1, 4-6 (1956); Note, 55 COLuM. L. Ray. 83, 87-89
(1955).
49 359 U.S. at 192.
50 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820).
51359 U.S. at 191.

52 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943). Dissenting in Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 215-16
(1957), Frankfurter, J., had pointed out the advantage of treating double jeopardy as

"within our supervisory jurisdiction," yet in Abbate he joined the majority infected with
hyper-constitutionalism.
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ported on the alternative ground that the gravamen of the federal offense
53
there involved was different from that of the state offense.
The Bartkus case, however, is not open to the same objection. On the assumptions made for the purposes of this article, Bartkus was decided correctly
by the Supreme Court of the United States. Bartkus was first acquitted of
bank robbery in a federal court. He was then convicted of the same robbery
by an Illinois court. The conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court of
Illinois. Therefore, the United States Supreme Court was bound by the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court as to the interpretation of Illinois law.
"In the absence of any prohibition in the Constitution or laws of the United
States, it is for the State to decide how far it will go." 54 It was not open to
the United States Supreme Court to find that double jeopardy between jurisdictions was prohibited by either the common law or the Constitution of
Illinois. It was the Supreme Court of Illinois that made the wrong decision
in the Bartkus case. 55 Since no statute in Illinois authorized two trials for
substantially the same crime, there was no necessity for the Illinois court to
reach the constitutional question. In the absence of such a statute the court
should have followed the common law principle that double jeopardy applies
56
as between jurisdictions. By its failure so to hold, Illinois fouled its own nest.
The duty of cleansing devolved on the state. It was performed a few months
after the Bartkus decision by the enactment of a statute abolishing double
57
jeopardy as between state and federal courts.
53 The problem of different offenses based on the same conduct is discussed, pp. 608-12
infra.
54 Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379, 384 (1930) (Holmes, J., in a different context).
55 People v. Bartkus, 7 111. 2d 138, 130 N.E.2d 187 (1955).
56 The question in Illinois had not been foreclosed by Eells v. People, 5 Inl. (4 Scam).
498 (1843), aff'd sub nom. Moore v. People, 55 U. S. (14 How.) 13 (1852), and Hoke v.
People, 122 M1.511, 13 N.E. 823 (1887). They were not double jeopardy cases, there having
been no prior prosecution. In discussing congressional intent, the court in the Hoke case
pointed out that-unlike Bartkus-the objects of the state and federal statutes were different. 122 Iln. at 517, 13 N.E. at 825.
In Bartkus the Court supports its opinion by listing Illinois and many other states
as having done what I describe as fouling their own nests. The Court concedes, however,
that among those state cases there was careless reasoning and "offhand dictum." 359 U.S.
at 135 n.24. I have not attempted an analysis of the law of each of these states, though
I urge it on persons interested in showing that their state is free to follow the line advocated
in this article, irrespective of the unthinking dicta of courts not faced with an actual multiple
prosecution.
5
7ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 601.1 (1959). Fifteen other states already had similar statutes.
The California statute is quoied on pp. 607-08 infra. Obviously I regard those statutes as declaratory of the common law. Those statutes are in accord with the Field Code and the A.L.I.
MODEL PENAL CoDE § 1.11 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956). (These statutes are cited in Note,
44 MNN. L. REv. 534, 539 n.31 (1960)). Forty states have adopted the similar provision of
the Utn mOi
NARcoTic DRUG Acr § 21. Congress has adopted similar provisions to prevent
federal retrial for stealing from instrumentalities of interstate commerce. 18 U.S.C.
§§ 659, 660, 2117 (1958). Thus the states and Congress have shown a willingness, in my
view, to declare the common law rule and so abjure any constitutional power to retry. They
never enact the converse statute asserting the power.
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It is apparent that the whole of the preceding analysis rests on the proposition that the principle against double jeopardy is a living common law principle, and that it includes not only recognition of a sovereignty's own prior
criminal judgments but those of foreign jurisdictions as well.
Let us now look at the authorities.
Double Jeopardy at Common Law. The principle against double jeopardy is
ancient and well established at common law.58 Although double jeopardy is
forbidden by the constitutions of most of the states, it is not mentioned in
the constitutions of Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, North Carolina
and Vermont. In each of these five states the courts found that common law
prohibited double jeopardy.5 9 The Vermont court said: "Constitutional
provisions against double jeopardy are regarded as merely declaratory of the
common law." 60 The legislation in Massachusetts, for example, like the constitutions and legislation in the other states, is also declaratory of the com6
mon law. 1
Further, the common law authorities dealt specifically with the two sovereignties situation. The principle against double jeopardy, as it applies between
jurisdictions, is part of "that branch of private law which is variously termed
'Private International Law,' 'Conflict of Laws,' 62 'Comity' ... in accordance
with which the courts of one country or 'jurisdiction' will ordinarily, in the
absence of a local policy to the contrary, extend recognition and enforcement to rights claimed by individuals by virtue of the laws or judicial decisions
of another country or jurisdiction."63 While it is sometimes called "merely
comity," of course comity which the courts enforce, like equity, is law.
It has been established in England since Rex v. Thomas64 in 1664, Rex v.
Hutchinson,65 1678, and Rex v. Roche,66 1775, that acquittal by one nation
prevents retrial in another. Those cases are so confusingly reported that they
do not by themselves clearly show what was decided; their authority stems
from the fact that the English,from then until now, have always treated them
58

See the authorities collected in Mr. Justice Black's dissenting opinion in Bartkus,
359 U.S. at 151-55.
59 For citation see opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Vinson in Brock v. North Carolina, 344
U.S. 424, 435 (1953) (dissenting opinion). I find no subsequent change.
60 State v. O'Brien, 106 Vt. 97, 103, 170 Atl. 98 (1934).

61 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 263, §§ 7-8(a) (1959); Commonwealth v. Mahoney, 331 Mass.
510, 512, 120 N.E.2d 645 (1954).
62 Conflict of laws is a term not confined to civil liability. See, e.g., LEFLAR, CoNFIUcr
OF LAWS (1959). Cf. JsssuP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW 113 (1956). (Footnote by the author.)
63 CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION 651 (1953).
64 82 Eng. Rep. 1043 (1664).
65 As reported in Beak v. Thyrwhit, 87 Eng. Rep. 124 (1689).

66 168 Eng. Rep. 169 (1775).
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as having establishedthe principle. There are many examples. 67 An early one
is Leonard MacNally, who stated in 1802 that "an acquittal on a criminal
charge in a foreign country may be pleaded in bar of an indictment for the
same offence in England." 6 8 An authoritative contemporary example
is Kenny, who, in 1958, in his Outline of CriminalLaw, said: "even though it
were in a foreign country that the acquittal or conviction took place, it will
69
none the less constitute a defence in our courts."
Utilizing the Common Law Principle. When a prosecutor jumps to the conclusion that he may retry a man for essentially the same conduct under a different section of the criminal code, he feels authorized to do so by the simple
mandate of that different section. It contains no qualification. For example,
In re NielsenO dealt with a federal statute which provided: "that whoever
commits adultery shall be punished by imprisonment... ."71 There is nothing
in that statute that says "except when he has previously been acquitted or
convicted for the same acts treated as unlawful cohabitation under 22 Stat. 31,
c. 47."72 So the prosecutor had gone ahead and got a second conviction in
spite of the man's previous conviction for unlawful cohabitation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the second prosecution was barred be67

See Grant, supra note 48, at 9-10. A footnote to the report of Rex v. Roche, 168 Eng.
Rep. 169 (1775) contains the following: "It is a bar because a final determination in a
court having competent jurisdiction is conclusive in all courts of concurrent jurisdiction."
68 Rtys OF Evrmc ON PLEAS OF THE CRowN 428 (1802).
69 OuTLiNE OF CRuMINAL LAW 563 (17th ed. 1958). Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in his

opinion for the Court in Bartkus, fails to mention the English interpretation of the early
English cases, overlooking its significance as he dismisses those cases as "dubious" because of (1) "the confused and inadequate reporting" of Rex v. Hutchinson, and (2)
"because they reflect a power of discretion vested in English judges not relevant to the
constitutional law of our federalism." 359 U.S. at 128 n.9. Actually, both reasons are irrelevant to the ground upon which the Bartkus decision is based. The opinion clearly shows
that it is based on the presumed requirements of American federalism. It decides that
whatever the common law of doublejeopardy may be, our federal system requires that there
be an exception when two sovereignties are involved. (See text accompanying note 41 supra.)
In the Court's view, its decision would have been the same whatever the English common
law at the time of the American Revolution and whatever discretion the English judges
had in applying it. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, therefore, did not help his decision by suggesting, in disregard of his normal respect for English authority, that English law is not what
the English have always said it was.
Nor, incidentally, did he help it by devoting four pages and a ten-page appendix (359
U.S. at 124-28, 140-49) to a well established point not at issue in the case and which had
been conceded in the briefs, namely, that the fourteenth amendment does not incorporate
everything in the first eight. This learned exposition will no doubt be helpful to the bar,
even to the bench, and particularly to the newer members of the Court who on this occasion
put their names to it for the first time. Cf. Note, 1959 U. ILL. L.F. 677, 679 n.20.
70 131 U.S. 176 (1889).
7125 Stat. 635 (1887).
72 The defendant in Nielsen was also charged with violating 22 Stat. 31 (1882).
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cause the two offenses were essentially the same. 73 The Court viewed the case
as an interpretation of the fifth amendment, but of course its approach would
have been the same if, like those states which have neither a constitutional nor
a legislative prohibition of double jeopardy, the Court had been interpreting
the common law directly. 74 In either case the prosecution would be barred by
the principle against double jeopardy.
It may be worth observing that the mandate of a statute is never expressly
qualified by a provision in the statute prohibiting retrial of a man for the same
conduct under the same section of the criminal code. What prevents the retrial? Constitutional provisions? If the statute were to be construed as authorizing the outrage of retrial, the statute would certainly be unconstitutional pro tanto. But surely it is not necessary to treat every criminal statute
as unconstitutional pro tanto in order to prevent a man from being retried
under the same section. Surely the legislature did not intend thus to punish
people repeatedly. The issue of statutory construction arises before the constitutional question is reached.
The statute must, of course, be construed in the light of common law principles. There are some analogous situations. Statutes are often interpreted as
requiring mens rea or scienter even if they contain no "intentionally" or
"wilfully." 75 Also analogous is the common law rule that statutes shall not
be interpreted retrospectively, but only prospectively, even though the statute
contains no "hereafter" and is unqualified on its face. Likewise, the defense
of entrapment, far less fundamental than double jeopardy, is allowed-in the
rare case when it is proper-even though there is nothing about entrapment in
any statute. Accordingly, in the absence of an express provision permitting
duplicate trials, no statute ought to be construed as abrogating the common
law doctrine of double jeopardy any more than statutes couched in general
terms should be construed as abrogating the doctrines of mens rea, prospec76
tive construction or entrapment.
73 Mr. Justice Brennan, writing in Bartkus, seems to be mistaken when he says that in
Nielsen "a different federal interest was protected by each statute." 359 U.S. at 201. The
legislative history shows that both statutes in Nielsen were anti-polygamy statutes, the later
being an act to amend the first. 18 Cong. Rec. 581-96, 1897-1904 (1887).
74 Cf. State v. Benham, 7 Conn. 414 (1829).
75
InSmith v. California, Mr. Justice Frankfurter referred to "the general principle that
awareness of what one is doing is a prerequisite for the infliction of punishment." 361
U.S. 147, 162 (1959) (concurring opinion). Of course there are exceptions to the principle.
76 Similarly, the doctrine of diplomatic immunity (to which reference has already been
made in another context, in text accompanying note 42 supra), though embodied in an
American statute since 1790 (1 Stat. 117 (1790), 22 U.S.C. § 252 (1958)), was a defense
at common law. It has been said that the statute is declaratory of less than the full scope of
diplomatic immunity at common law, and, perhaps dubiously, that the wider scope is
nevertheless still in effect. See Bergman v. DeSieyes, 71 F. Supp. 334 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
Irrespective of what has been said in the text as to double jeopardy, the mandate of the
statute may be sufficient to justify cumulating punishment at one trial. Burton v. United
States, 202 U.S. 344, 377 (1906). As to cumulated punishment, see note 96 infra.
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A statute prohibiting the sale of narcotics is as silent on the question of entrapment
as it is on the admission of illegally obtained evidence. It is enacted, however, on
the basis of certain presuppositions concerning the established legal order and the
role of the courts within that system in formulating standards for the administration
of criminal justice when Congress has not specifically legislated to that end. Specific
statutes are to be fitted into an antecedent legal system.77
The job of fitting them in was overlooked in Lanza and Abbate, and in the
Bartkus case in its Illinois stage, by courts bemused with constitutionalism. 7 S
A few extreme examples will show the unsoundness of disregarding, as between sovereignties, the common law rule against double jeopardy.
The Federal Assimilative Crimes Act79 automatically turns new state laws
into the status of federal law in a federal enclave, such as a national park or
military reservation. Assume that in some federal enclave where there is concurrent jurisdiction with the state80 the state creates a sex offense 8 ' which
ipso facto becomes a federal crime. Therefore, accepting the Abbate and Bartkus doctrine, it is constitutionally permissible for a man to be tried twice for
the same act under two identical statutes. Under the thesis of this article all
that means is that it is constitutionallypermissiblefor Congress and the state
legislatures to pass statutes authorizing the double prosecution. It would be
extraordinary for them to pass such legislation; where laws on the subject
exist they forbid double prosecutions. Until Congress does the extraordinary
thing, 82 the Assimilative Crimes Act can best be interpreted as embodying
77
Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 381 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in
the result) (emphasis added). On that case and entrapment generally, see Note, 73 HAxv.
L. PEv. 1333 (1960).
78 Even though Mr. Justice Frankfurter regarded the common law authorities as unsatisfactory for constitutional interpretation (see note 69 supra), there would seem to be enough
to have justified the Abbate Court in laying down a standard of criminal justice to prevent
interjurisdictional double jeopardy until Congress indicates otherwise. There is more
reason for a court to do that than, for example, to "mint" the doctrine of entrapment,
as Glanville Williams describes it. WILIMs, CRIuMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART 623
(1953). Williams treats entrapment and mens rea as being in "the general part" of criminal
law, not mentioning double jeopardy. Apparently he regards double jeopardy as a procedural doctrine. This may have significance for those who believe that procedural due process
has a claim on judicial attention superior to that of substantive due process. "Double jeopardy, looked at as a restriction on the rights of the Government... is a substantive matter
... " Steffen, Double Jeopardy and the New Rules, 7 FED. B.J. 86 (1945), but it is also procedural in the sense that it does not apply to any particular crime but affects the course
of litigation generally.
79 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1958).
80 See 18 U.S.C. § 73 (1958).
8l As in United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286 (1958).
82
Congress might conceivably authorize retrial for some crime where state prosecutions
had become so corrupt, inefficient or locally unpopular as to justify that extraordinary
procedure. Instead, Congress would be more likely to make a partial or total pre-emption
of the field. (See Mr. Justice Black's dissenting opinion in Abbate, 359 U.S. at 202 n.2.)
But there might be cases where pre-emption could not extend; e.g., to nullify the state's
police power over a simple assault.
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the common law defense of double jeopardy. 83 Similarly, until the state has
legislated to the contrary, the original state statute should also be interpreted
to recognize the bar of a federal criminal judgment.
Recognition of the common law defense of double jeopardy would silence
an unpleasant suggestion that American military authorities might be able
"to transfer an accused to a different country in order to try him for an offense
for which he has previously been tried by a tribunal of the country in which
84
he has been stationed."
A further example of the patent desirability of construing duplicate statutes
as being subject to the common law defense of interjurisdictional double
jeopardy is produced by a state criminal statute enacted for the very purpose
of protecting a federal right-for example, a statute to enforce a provision of
the postal laws which is cast in the same terms as the federal statute. Surely
such a statute ought not to be construed as making duplicate trials automatically available.85
It is my thesis that the same approach is applicable even when the two
statutes are not textually identical-as they rarely are when two jurisdictions
are involved. The law of murder is expressed differently in different countries,
yet if a man has been tried for murder in Canada and acquitted or convicted,
he ought not to be tried over again here just because the homicide took place
on the international boundary under circumstances that made jurisdiction
concurrent. It is not only the common law, as we have seen, that respects
criminal judgments of foreign countries; so does civil law. For example, no
prosecution can take place in France if the accused can show that his case has
been finally disposed of abroad. In case of conviction, this includes showing
that he has served his sentence, that the statute of limitations has run, or that
86
he has been pardoned.
The State of California has proceeded similarly under its statute requiring
recognition of foreign criminal judgments: "When an act charged as a public
83With or without such a statute it would seem to be bad policy to put a conscientious
prosecutor under pressure to retry state prosecutions where there is concurrent jurisdiction.
In order to prevent federal prosecutors from feeling such pressure, the Attorney General
of the United States issued a memorandum instructing them not to do so-unless an exception were made with his approval. See Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529, 531 (1960).
Without exploring (as three justices did, at p. 533) the dubiously wide discretion thus assumed
by the Attorney General to determine what is an exceptional case, it would seem that both
he and the Supreme Court are wrong in thinking that he has any discretion to prosecute
before Congress gives it to him.
84 Note, 70 IIARv. L. REv. 1043, 1064 (1957).
5 The early federal statute authorizing state enforcement of the postal laws is still
in effect. 17 Stat. 323 (1872), 39 U.S.C. § 825 (1958). (On state enforcement of federal rights
see Note, 73 HAgv.L. Rv.1551 (1960)). As to the situation where the state offense is
literally for violation of the "very" federal statute, see Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 130.
8
6CODE ANNo DE PRocEDuRE PENAL arts. 5,7 (France 1958). See DoNNnIEU DE
VABRES, TRArnl DE DRorr CRImqmm 1006-09, §§ 1855-63 (1947).
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offense is within the jurisdiction of another state or country, as well as of this
state, a conviction or acquittal thereof in the former is a bar to the prosecution or indictment therefor in this state." 87 A homicide was committed in
California by a man named Coumas under circumstances which gave Greece
concurrent jurisdiction. He was convicted in Greece and served a prison term
of several years. The Supreme Court of California held that further prosecution in California was barred, even though the California charges were "murder" and "assault with a deadly weapon," whereas the Greek conviction had
been for "manslaughter" and "unlawful carrying of a firearm." 88
The California statute-and similar statutes in other states-are apparently
declaratory of the common law. 89 However that may be, the California court
interpreted the statute in the light of the common law. There was no narrow
dialectico concluding that the Greek and the California offenses were different because they were expressed differently in the statute books. California
refused to try Coumas over again for what was really the same thing.
THE "SAmB OFFNSE"
This article is concerned only with situations where the courts are willing
to say, as they did in Coumas and In re Nielsen, that the two trials are for
what is in substance the same offense. To decide whether they are or not is a
troublesome problem. To help reach a decision in the widely differing classes
of cases that come up, the courts no doubt need rules of thumb to subdivide
and implement the double jeopardy principle. The rules that have been developed are unsatisfactory and confused.91
The most popular solution is to permit retrial for the same act if each
statute requires proof of an additional fact that the other does not. Though
expressed in innumerable cases and the Model Penal Code,92 the solution is
demonstrably inadequate. 93 Suppose, for example, that a statute expressly
87 CAL. PENAL CODE § 793.
88 Coumas v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 2d 682, 192 P.2d 449 (1948). "Where the foreign
[tort] judgment is based on a statute substantially similar to one of the forum, recognition
will also be granted easily." 1 EmiENzwEwG, CONFLIcr OF LAWS 216 (1959) (emphasis
added). See id. at 131 on the status of foreign tort actions.
89See note 57 supra.
90 As has sometimes come from New York. See cases cited in Bartkus v. Illinois, 359
U.S. 121, 138 n.29 (1959), and People v. Tutuska, 19 Misc. 2d 308, 192 N.Y.S.2d 350
(1959), aff'd, 206 N.Y.S.2d 1006 (1960).
91 The floundering of the courts has received attention in the literature. For a glance at
the chaos see 15 AM. JuR. Criminal Law §§ 380-84 (1938) and Comment, 65 YALE L.J.
339, 344-46 (1956). It is beyond the scope of this article to analyze the many facets of the
difficult problem of what, for purposes of double jeopardy, is "the same offense."
92 § 1.10(l) (b) (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956).
93 Itwould be adequate if the "additional fact" were in some way required to be a
significant fact, as Judge Friendly discerned. United States v. Sabella, 272 F.2d 206, 212
(2d Cir. 1959). This must mean significance in the light of double jeopardy policy, i.e.,
whether "upon considerations of what constitutes substantial justice in criminal procedure"
(Mayers & Yarbrough, spra note 6, at 8) it is "fair to subject the defendant to another
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makes separate crimes of robbery after nightfall, robbery with a gun, robbery
while wearing a mask, and (like the Federal Bank Robbery Act94) robbery
of a bank and entry of a building used in part as a bank with intent to commit robbery. Each crime has its unique fact to be proved. Thus under the
"additional fact" test a man could be tried for robbery with a gun (without
mentioning the mask), acquitted, and then retried for the same robbery with
a mask (without mentioning the gun).9 5 Even worse, ifit is one crime to rob a
bank that is a member of the Federal Reserve System and another to rob a
member of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the test would permit
a man to be prosecuted twice for one robbery of a bank that is a member of
both, though the difference between the offenses is unconnected with any
activity on his part. It would deprive the double jeopardy concept of all meaning to use those separate crimes to try a man repeatedly for the same robbery. 96
criminal proceeding." Note, 74 -ARv. L. REV. 752, 754 (1961). "The test [of autrefois convict] is not whether the facts relied upon in the two trials are the same. It is whether the
prisoner has been convicted of an offence which is the same or practicallythe same offence
as that with which he is charged." ARCHBOLD, PLEADING, EVIDENCE AND PRACrICE IN
C MNAL CASEs 155 (34th ed. 1959) (emphasis added).
94 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (1958).

95 Cf. 28 U. Cm. L. REv. 142, 150 n.36 (1960).
96
However, the additional facts required in some of the crimes may embody elements
that make the crime more serious and hence justify lumping several of them in one trial
in order to increase punishment. But for a man to have the amount of his punishment thus
increased by overlapping offenses litigated in one trial is a very different thing from being
tried for them seriatim. The reasons for the defense of double jeopardy against retrial
(described at pages 592-94 supra) do not apply to duplication of offenses at one trial. Such
duplication lacks the harassment of repeated prosecutions and the attendant anxiety,
uncertainty and expense. It lacks the demoralizing feature of undoing what the court has
done. It is not double jeopardy. Double jeopardy implies two trials. But sound holdings
that two offenses are different so as to permit double punishment has led many judges
to the erroneous conclusion that a man may be tried first for one and later for the other.
These judges have been tempted by the convenience of treating each offense as an interchangeable unit of the crime, or "unit of prosecution" for purposes of both double jeopardy
and multiple punishment. There is no such interchangeable unit. "[N]o single definition
of 'same offense' will adequately cover both the double punishment and the double prosecution situations." Note, 11 STAN. L. REv. 735,746 (1959); Note, 28 U. Cm. L. REv. 308 (1961).
As recently as Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 11 (1953), the Supreme Court was
still using double jeopardy terminology for multiple punishment. But the Court understands
that multiple punishment is different and would normally raise no constitutional issue.
Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 173 (1598).
The difference is brought out by Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386 (1958) (on Gore
see separate opinion of Breunan, J., in Abbate, 359 U.S. at 197-200), where a single sale of
narcotics was held to be three offenses for the purpose of determining the amount of
punishment: (1) not making the sale pursuant to a written order, (2) not making the sale
in the original stamped package, and (3) facilitating the concealment and sale of narcotics.
But that decision is a very different thing from the supposititious case where the prosecutor
selects only one of the three offenses, resulting in an acquittal or a conviction for that offense.
Can the accused then be tried over again for one of the other offenses on the basis of the
same sale?And a third time? Unthinkable though that is to me, there are judges who will
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For our argument it is sufficient that there are situations like Nielsen where
the courts look through the difference between two crimes as they appear in
the statute books and reach the conclusion that they are the same crime for
the purpose of double jeopardy. One example is the rule of thumb that the
greater crime includes the lesser. Another example is the "continuing" crime
doctrine, by which separate acts in a continuing crime like unlawful cohabitation constitute but a single crime for purposes of double jeopardy. 97
A clean-cut solution favored by a few courts, writers and Mr. Justice Brennan9 s is to look only at the act or conduct of the defendant. Differences in the
statutory definitions of crimes are disregarded. The result is simply that the
defendant cannot be tried twice for the same act or conduct. 99 This test has
the merit of simplicity. Further, it is in accord with enlightened criminal procedure00 which requires a prosecutor to prepare and present at one trial one
complete case based on every aspect of the defendant's act, instead of allowing the prosecutor to have several tries at a man for various aspects of the
same act.

Although the "same conduct" test is a good rule, precedent says that it is
not required by the Constitution. The overwhelming mass of decisions authorizes such retrial where the purposes of the two statutes are different.101 Although it is just as great a harassment of the individual as where the retrial is
under the same statute, it is less violative ofjudicialorder to retry a man under
two statutes differing in gravamen. If this "same conduct" test is incorporated
in the fifth amendment it would require the Court to set aside a possible act
of Congress which expressly provided that a man could be tried separately
approve on the ground that each of the three is "a separate offense." For example, one
Petite was tried and convicted under 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1001 (1958) of conspiracy to make
false statements to an agency of the United States in a deportation hearing. Petite paid his
fine and served a two months sentence, which apparently was not long enough in the judgment of the federal prosecutors. So he was tried and convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1622
(1958) for suborning the same peijury. United States v. Petite, 147 F. Supp. 791 (1957),
aff'd, 262 F.2d 788 (1958). These two federal court opinions show no trace of realization
that double jeopardy might differ from double punishment. The conviction, however, seemed
unjust to the Attorney General. On his motion, arguing that the double prosecution was
unfair and contrary to the policy of the federal government, the case was dismissed. Petite
v. United States, 361 U.S. 529 (1960). Cf. note 83 supra.
97

In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176 (1889). See also 15 AM. JuR. CriminalLaw §§ 381, 386,

388 (1938).
98 See his separate opinion in Abbate, 359 U.S. at 196-201; Kirchheimer, The Act, the
Offense and Double Jeopardy, 58 YALE L.J. 513, 532 (1949): Note, 11 STAN. L. Rnv. 735,
743-45 (1959).
99

Cumulative sentencing for each statute violation would still be available by presenting

all the offenses at the same trial. See note 96 supra.
100 MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.08(2), comment (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956).
101 See 15 AM. JuR. CriminalLaw § 380 et seq (1938). Cf Hoke v. People, 122 Ill. 511,
13 N.E. 823 (1883), referred to in note 56 supra.
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for an ordinary assault and for interfering with the right to vote. 102 That
would seem to be going too far. A fortiori it is not likely that due process
under the fourteenth amendment will be found violated by what has failed
to shock the conscience of so many judges. Legal history shows that it has
not been deemed basically uncivilized to retry a man for the same act when it
is for violation of a statute having a different substance, gist, policy or gravamen. 103
However, it must, as we have argued, 104 violate the fourteenth amendment
to retry a man for essentially the same conduct under a statute which is essentially the same as the statute under which he was tried the first time. Surely
due process does not depend upon the verbal identity of two statutory provisions. Form must not be allowed to destroy substance-as it would if duplicate prosecutions were permitted by reason of such minor differences as those
in my illustrations of overlapping robbery and narcotics offenses. 105
It is beyond the limits of this article to go into the technique of determining
whether two statutes are the same in essence, protect the same social inter10 2

We are thus assuming that the same conduct violates two quite different statutes,
as in the classic illustration of selling liquor to a minor on Sunday. So that our topical
example may avoid jurisdictional problems between a state and the nation, we will assume
that both statutes and both prosecutions are federal and the affray took place in a national
park, where citizens may vote. See Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19 (1939); Arapajolu
v. McMenamin, 113 Cal. App. 2d 824, 249 P.2d 318 (1952). Therefore, the act on its surface
is an ordinary assault in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 113 (1958). We will assume that our defendant has either been acquitted under that section or has been given a small fine. Can
he be retired for interference with the right to vote under a court order protected by the
Civil Rights Act of 1960, 18 U.S.C. § 1509 (Supp. II, 1959-60)? To do so would obviously
violate the "same conduct" test. But here, unlike the bank robbery statutes, the two statutes
involved are quite different in gist and purpose. One is essentially to protect the person of
the citizen and to promote public order. The other is to prevent interference with the right
to vote and to promote its free exercise. The two statutes have different policies and protect
different federal interests. Embodying the "same conduct" test in the Constitution would
go so far as to require setting aside a possible act of Congress that expressly provided that
a man could be tried separately for an ordinary assault under § 113 and for interfering with
the right to vote under § 1509. In the absence of such a statute the Court, if it wished to
follow Mr. Justice Brennan's advocacy of the "same conduct" test, could prevent double
jeopardy by using the common law background as a manifestation of the Court's role
"in formulating standards for the administration of criminal justice when Congress has
not specifically legislated...." See notes 52 and 77 supra. But I believe that the Court,
and also state supreme courts in dealing with state law, is only bound to do so where the
two statutes involved have the same gist and purpose.
103 The "same conduct" test has always been deemed inapplicable to the recognition
of foreign judgments, civil or criminal, where the local policy is genuinely different from
that of the foreign jurisdiction. For example, the provisions of the French Code forbidding
international double jeopardy exclude cases of national security. See note 86 supra. The
judgment of a foreign country must also pass the test of whether the foreign proceedings
are sufficiently civilized to give substantial justice "upon an analogy to the requirements of
due process of law." STru1mnRG, CoNF.ier or LAWS 133 (1951); Coumas v. Superior Court,

31 Cal. 2d 682, 192 P.2d 449 (1948).
104 See pp. 595-97 supra.
105 See note 96 supra.
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ests, or have the same gist, policy or gravamen for purposes of double jeopardy. The task is a heavy one but it cannot be evaded. It must be faced by the
courts in interpreting both the common law and the due process provisions
of the federal and state constitutions.1 06 Otherwise the ancient right against
double jeopardy will become an empty formalism. "In passing upon constitutional questions the Court has regard to substance and not to mere matters
of form."' 107 To prevent a constitutional right from being evaded by indirection is the high function of the Supreme Court of the United States.108 That
function can be performed only if the courts recognize the seriousness of the
double jeopardy principle.
DOUBLE JEOPARDY BETWEEN

THE

STATES

How ought one state of the United States regard the criminal judgments of
another? Bartkus at first sight seems to be a precedent for disregard. Bartkus
rests on federalism; the states' relations to each other are part of federalism.
But without going into the subject extensively, let us look a little further.
This article insists that double jeopardy is a violation of due process; that
Bartkus and Abbate, not denying it, decided that the nation-state relationship
requires in those cases a particular exception to principle. Exceptions to
principle should, of course, be restricted to the necessary. Is the exception
necessary as between state and state? There the balance is less delicate than
between state and nation. There, too, the principle of full faith and credit
weighs heavily in the other direction. There is good reason for a state to respect the criminal as well as the civil judgments of its sister states.
Here, too, the gist of the statutes is to be examined. The rule of looking
solely to the defendant's conduct-will again be found to be a good guide for
state legislative action, or even for state judicial supervision of its criminal
procedure, but as a constitutional rule it is unsuitable, since, as is well established, a state need not respect the civil (or penal) judgments of a sister state
when they are contrary to its policy. Whether the statute has a different
policy from that of the similar statute of the other sovereignty may be a crucial
matter. But it would seem that where there is no difference in policy the Supreme Court should, under the requirements both of due process and of full
faith and credit, prevent Illinois, for example, from trying over again a man
who had been finally acquitted or convicted in Iowa for a homicide committed on a steamboat in the Mississippi River, where the two states have
106 Also in interpreting statutes. "The proper solution of that [difficult] problem [whether
the federal and state statutes are so much alike as to bar a second prosecution under the
New York statute] frequently depends upon a judgment of the gravamenof the state statute."
Bartkus, at 138 (emphasis added). Cf. Coumas v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 2d 682, 192 P.2d
449 (1948).
107 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 708 (1931) (Hughes, C.J.).
108 Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649,664 (1944); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 17 (1958).
It is not as difficult a task for the Court as balancing federalism against due process.
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current jurisdiction.109 Such a constitutional rule was forecast by Justice
Brewer in his dictum for a unanimous court:
Where an act is malum in se prohibited and punishable by the laws of both
States, the one first acquiring jurisdiction of the person may ,prosecute the offense,
and its judgment is a finality in both States, so that one convicted or acquitted in
the courts of the one State cannot be prosecuted for the same offense in the courts
of the other.1 10
Implicit in Brewer's statement is a realization of the basic value of the
double jeopardy principle. If such realization were general, judges would
not be so ready to undermine the principle by subjecting people to retrial
on the ground that the Constitution does not prevent it or because two
statutes differ in some inconsequential way.
109 But see Phillips v. People, 55 IlM.429 (1870).

110 Nielsen v. Oregon, 212 U.S. 315, 320 (1909).

